In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non-experiential states such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how non-philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether the folk even tend to classify mental states in terms of their being or not being phenomenally conscious in the first place. Things have changed dramatically in the last few years, however, with a flurry of ground-breaking research by psychologists and experimental philosophers. In this article I will review this work, carefully distinguishing between two questions: First, are the ascriptions that the folk make with regard to the mental states that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious related to their decisions about whether morally right or wrong action has been done to an entity? Second, do the folk tend to classify mental states in the way that philosophers do, distinguishing between mental states that are phenomenally conscious and mental states that are not phenomenally conscious?
to say with regard to folk psychological judgments about these mental states, this has changed in recent years with a spate of exciting new work being done by experimental philosophers and psychologists (Gray, Gray, and Wegner; Knobe and Prinz; Sytsma and Machery 'How to Study', 'Two Conceptions'; Sytsma 'Dennett's Theory'; Arico; Arico, Fiala, Goldberg, and Nichols; Huebner; Huebner, Bruno, and Sarkissian).
Following Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz, much of this literature has focused on the question of whether the folk have, perhaps implicitly, something like the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness. I (now) think that this is unfortunate for several reasons. First, to answer this question requires having a clear understanding of the philosophical concept, but philosophers are not always clear on the point and it is arguable that there are in fact many different concepts at play. Second, an adequate answer to this question requires a metric for comparing the similarity of concepts, which might depend on the theory of concepts that one endorses. Finally, the literature most clearly deals with a prior question that can be answered without giving a full articulation of the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness or how a folk concept might be similar to it. The prior question is whether or not the folk classify mental states as philosophers do: Do the folk treat mental states as dividing into two basic kinds (those that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious and those that they do not), tending to treat mental states of each kind similarly?
Focusing on the question of how the folk classify the mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious, we do not need to give a full account of the concept of phenomenal consciousness. Rather, it will suffice to note which mental states philosophers classify as being phenomenally conscious. Philosophers of mind typically hold that there is "something it is like" (Nagel) to be in a diverse range of mental states. These mental states are thought to be phenomenally conscious in virtue of having distinctive phenomenal qualities and uncontroversial examples include perceptual states (seeing red, hearing a C#) and bodily sensations (feeling pain, nausea); further, felt emotions and felt moods (happiness, depression) are often added to this list (Levin; Tye) . Phenomenally conscious mental states are generally contrasted with states like beliefs and desires that are thought to be non-phenomenal.
In this article, I will examine recent empirical research on how ordinary people understand the mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious.
2 In particular, I will consider two questions: Are the ascriptions that the folk make with regard to phenomenally conscious mental states involved in their judgments about whether an action is morally right or wrong? And, do the folk classify mental states as philosophers do, treating them as dividing into two basic kinds-mental states that are phenomenally conscious and mental states that are not phenomenally conscious?
I will survey recent work on these two questions, respectively, in Sections 1 and 2.
Overall, this research suggests an affirmative answer to the first question, at least for some of the relevant mental states, but a tentative negative answer to the second question. Specifically, work by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery ('Two Conceptions') indicates that the folk do not tend to classify mental states as philosophers do. They go on to suggest that the fundamental division for the folk instead centers on whether or not a mental state is thought to have a valence. This valence hypothesis is explored in Section 3, and I suggest that it is compatible with the research linking the folk classification of mental states to moral cognition. Finally, in Section 4, I consider further directions that research on the folk understanding of mental states that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious is taking.
Phenomenal Consciousness and Moral Patiency
Heather Gray, Kurt Gray, and Daniel Wegner present evidence that people distinguish between two broad aspects of having a mind. called on prediction, explanation or control). They conclude that "it seems that ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are best understood in terms of their role in facilitating moral judgment" (82).
Classifying Phenomenally Conscious Mental States
Despite the links drawn between moral cognition and ascriptions of phenomenally conscious mental states by Knobe and Prinz, it is important to reiterate that there are two distinct questions to be asked: First, are judgments about (at least some of) the mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious involved in ascriptions of moral patiency?
Second, do the folk classify mental states as philosophers do? While the above work indicates that folk judgments about some of the mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious are involved in moral cognition, the evidence is less clear with regard to the question of whether the folk classify mental states in a way that corresponds with the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness.
In addition to giving a positive answer to the first question, Knobe and Prinz also gave a positive answer to the second question. Most importantly, in the second of their five studies, they asked participants to indicate how natural sounding a range of ten sentences ascribing mental states to a group agent (Acme Corporation) were. They found that participants rated the five sentences that ascribed mental states that philosophers typically take to be phenomenally conscious as less natural sounding than the five sentences that ascribed mental states that philosophers do not typically take to be phenomenally conscious. 3 The results are shown in Figure 1 . This conclusion has attracted the attention of critics, however (Arico; Sytsma and Machery 'How to Study'). Notably, Sytsma and Machery target the conclusion that the folk 3 The five non-phenomenal sentences are: Acme Corp. believes that its profit margin will soon increase; Acme Corp. intends to release a new product this January; Acme Corp. wants to change its corporate image; Acme Corp. knows that it can never compete with GenCorp in the pharmaceuticals market; Acme Corp. has just decided to adopt a new marketing plan. (either an undergraduate student or a simple robot) performing behaviorally analogous tasks that were designed to elicit judgments that the undergraduate had undergone a phenomenally conscious mental state. In each of the scenarios either the undergraduate or the robot was instructed to manipulate one of three boxes distinguished by color. In two of the four scenarios, that manipulation was successful and the participants were asked whether the agent "saw red," answering on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 with "clearly no," at 4 with "not sure,"
and at 7 with "clearly yes." In the other two scenarios, the agent was electrically shocked and participants were asked whether the agent "felt pain," answering on the same scale.
Dividing the participants into two groups on the basis of their philosophical training, Sytsma and Machery found that the responses of philosophers were consistent with the hypothesis, while the responses of non-philosophers were not. They found that the philosophers surveyed treated the perceptual experience and the bodily sensation analogously, refusing to ascribe either state to the robot and ascribing both states to the undergraduate. In sharp contrast to philosophers, however, non-philosophers did not treat these states analogously: While non-philosophers were willing to ascribe both the perceptual state of seeing red and the bodily sensation of feeling pain to the undergraduate, they diverged from philosophers in ascribing seeing red to the robot. Like philosophers, the non-philosophers surveyed were not willing to ascribe feeling pain to the robot. The results are shown graphically in Figure 2 . In contrast to the prediction derived from Knobe and Prinz's claim that the folk have the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness, Sytsma and Machery's results suggest that there is a divergence between how philosophers and the folk classify mental states. On average, the folk (but not philosophers) were willing to ascribe the perceptual state of seeing red to a simple robot. As such, their results offer some preliminary evidence that in contrast to philosophers, the folk do not tend to treat the mental states tested as being of the same type, i.e. as both being phenomenally conscious.
Sytsma and Machery discuss a number of objections that have been raised against the conclusion they draw from their first study. Most prominently, it has been argued that nonphilosophers do take mental states like seeing red and feeling pain to be phenomenally conscious, but that they simply do not make use of those judgments in this study. Specifically, it has been suggested that non-philosophers distinguish between two senses of the term "see"-one that only requires that the agent make the relevant discriminations between perceptual stimuli and one that requires that the agent be in the relevant phenomenally conscious mental state; the critic then argues that the non-philosophers in Sytsma and
Machery's study read the test question in the first sense when they affirmed that the robot "sees red." This argument was suggested by Bryce Huebner and forcefully put forward by
Eric Schwitzgebel in his commentary on Sytsma and Machery's paper at the 2008 Society for
Philosophy and Psychology meeting.
Sytsma ('Dennett's Theory') has responded to this objection further, presenting evidence that the folk by and large hold a naïve view of colors, treating the colors that we are acquainted with in ordinary perception as mind-independent qualities of external objects. This view of colors is not straightforwardly compatible with dividing "seeing" into the two senses suggested above: The relevant discriminations are with regard to the colors that we are acquainted with and these colors are not taken to be mental. More surprisingly, Sytsma presents evidence suggesting that the folk also by and large hold a naïve view of pains.
Accepting for the sake of discussion that the folk do not classify mental states as philosophers do, how do they classify mental states? Sytsma and Machery investigate this question in two follow-up studies. Their results suggest that the folk classify mental states in terms of whether or not they are thought to have a valence.
Folk Ascriptions and Valence
Sytsma and Machery's second and third studies used the same methodology as their firstcomparing a simple robot to a normal human-to explore the responses of non-philosophers for the mental states of feeling anger and smelling a range of olfactory stimuli. In their second study they found that while participants treated feeling anger analogously to feeling pain (denying both of the robot), they were split on the attribution of smelling banana to the robot (the mean response was not significantly different from a neutral response). Sytsma and Machery hypothesized that the folk's willingness to ascribe mental states to a simple robot was sensitive to whether or not they associated a valence with that state; that is, whether or not they thought it was essential to being in the state is that it be either liked or disliked, or have an "hedonic value" (Robbins and Jack). This hypothesis is nicely congruent with recent work by Nick Haslam and colleagues showing that people in Australia, China, and Italy found that in comparison to humans, robots "are most deficient in emotion and desire" (254).
In contrast to externally directed states like seeing a red box that are plausibly thought to lack valence, internally directed states like feeling pain are plausibly thought to critically involve a negative valence. States like smelling banana, however, both involve perceptual discriminations of external stimuli and are plausibly thought to involve a positive valence that is not critical to the perceptual discriminations. Sytsma and Machery hypothesized that the folk were divided in their judgments about whether the robot smelled banana because while they hold that the robot is capable of perceiving the scent of banana, they also hold that it is incapable of liking that scent. They then predicted that the folk would be willing to ascribe olfactory perceptual states to the robot that they did not associate with either a positive or a negative valence.
Sytsma and Machery's third study tested this prediction by comparing participants' responses for three olfactory stimuli-a familiar stimulus that participants were likely to think is pleasant to smell (banana), a familiar stimulus that participants were likely to think is unpleasant to smell (vomit), and a stimulus that participants were unlikely to be familiar with and therefore unlikely to think of as either pleasant or unpleasant to smell (isoamyl acetate).
They found that while the mean responses for banana and vomit were not significantly different from the neutral response, participants readily ascribed the state of smelling isoamyl acetate to the robot.
One potential objection to Sytsma and Machery's third study is that the folk did not treat the olfactory perceptual states differently because they made different judgments about whether these states had a valence, but treated them differently because one of the stimuli was thought to be more relevant to the robot's interests. Thus, it might be that participants were more likely to say that the robot smelled isoamyl acetate than banana because detecting chemicals is more relevant to the robot's interests than detecting pieces of fruit. 4 If this hypothesis is correct, then Sytsma and Machery's third study does not provide evidence in favor of the valence hypothesis, suggesting that an alternative explanation might be needed of why the folk treat perceptual states like seeing red differently from bodily sensations like feeling pain (both of which are plausibly relevant to the robot's interests).
Nonetheless, setting this objection aside for the sake of discussion, Sytsma and Machery argue that rather than classify mental states in terms of whether or not they are thought to be phenomenally conscious, the folk instead classify them in terms of whether or not they thought it was essential to being in the state that it have a valence. While this conclusion might seem to contradict the studies reviewed in Section 1, it is in fact quite to have a valence and not specifically to the agent being capable of having phenomenally conscious mental states. Thus, the fifth study conducted by Knobe and Prinz compares remembering with feeling. While remembering where to find food in a lake is not clearly suggestive of valence, this is not the case for feeling. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that in asking why a fisherman might want to know about whether fish are capable of feeling, there is an implication that the state of interest is pain (which is clearly associated with valence).
Sytsma and Machery conclude that if their hypothesis is correct, then it potentially has significant philosophical implications. Most notably, their findings cast doubt on a common justification given for the reality of the "hard problem of consciousness" (Chalmers, The Conscious Mind) . While philosophers like David Chalmers often justify the claim that there is a real problem, here, by arguing that phenomenal consciousness is undeniable because it is "the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives" ('Facing Up' 207), Sytsma and Machery's results suggest that phenomenal consciousness might not be so central and manifest. If their account of how the folk classify mental states is correct, then this suggests that the folk do not find it to be obvious that mental states like seeing red and feeling pain have something central in common (namely that they are phenomenally conscious), despite their first-person experience with such mental states.
An obvious response to Sytsma and Machery's argument is that just because the folk do not classify mental states as philosophers do, this does not imply that a hard problem does not arise with regard to some of the mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious. In particular, it might be argued that a new hard problem emerges for those states that people are unwilling to ascribe to the simple robot-that is, mental states that they think have a valence.
The core of the hard problem of consciousness is that certain mental states seem to resist functional explanation. As David Chalmers expresses the point ('Facing Up' 203):
"Even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience-perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report-there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?" This core of the hard problem could be maintained while restricting the range of "experiences" that are thought to pose a problem. have a related implication for some scientific work, putting pressure on scientists interested in explaining phenomenal consciousness. The argument is that the existence of phenomenal consciousness is often taken to be obvious to a subject just in undergoing the relevant mental states. But, it is not clear that phenomenal consciousness is obvsious to the folk despite their undergoing states like seeing red and feeling pain. As such, Sytsma argues that these researchers owe us an alternative justification for their claims that the supposed scientific phenomenon of phenomenal consciousness actually exists.
Whether or not Sytsma and Machery's theory of how the folk classify mental states is correct, and whether or not it has significant philosophical and scientific implications if it is, are questions that continue to be pursued.
Further Directions
The research reviewed above has made significant progress toward understanding how the folk classify mental states and the role of these classifications in judgments about moral patiency. This work suggests that while folk ascriptions of some mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious are involved in the judgments that the folk make about moral patiency, the way that they classify mental states might not coincide closely with the philosophical distinction between mental states that are phenomenally conscious and mental states that are not phenomenally conscious. Nonetheless, there is still much more work to be done in this area. In this section I discuss a few further directions that this work is taking.
As we saw above, Sytsma and Machery ('Two Conceptions') present preliminary evidence that how the folk classify mental states is linked to judgments about valence.
Currently, however, their findings only relate to a small sub-set of those states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious and only involve comparisons to one type of non-human agent (a simple robot Huebner has conducted two experiments comparing ascriptions of belief, pain, and happiness to four agents: a normal human, a cyborg with a human brain but a robot body, a cyborg with a human body but a robot brain, and a robot. Across the experiments he found that there was no significant difference in the participants' willingness to ascribe beliefs to each of the four agents. In contrast, Huebner found that they were significantly less likely to ascribe feeling pain to the two agents with robotic bodies than to the two with human bodies. For the case of happiness, however, participants were significantly more likely to ascribe the emotion to the human than to any of the other three agents. this might indicate the importance of judgments that an entity is living for ascriptions of mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious.
Conclusion
In investigating folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have primarily 
